Stealth Technology's Vulnerable Reality | Generated by AI
Pierre Sprey, a veteran aerospace engineer and co-designer of the F-16 fighter jet, has indeed made statements very close to the quote you shared. In a 2012 interview with CBC’s The Fifth Estate, he said: “The first thing to know about stealth is, it’s a scam. It simply does not work. Radars that were built in 1942 could detect every stealth airplane in the world today.” He’s been vocal about this criticism for years, often arguing that stealth technology is overhyped and vulnerable, especially to low-frequency radar systems.
Is he “right”? It’s a mixed bag—his core point has technical merit, but the claim is overstated and doesn’t tell the full story. Here’s a breakdown:
The Technical Reality of Stealth and Radar
Stealth aircraft (like the F-22, F-35, B-2, or F-117) aren’t invisible; they’re designed to minimize their radar cross-section (RCS)—essentially how “visible” they appear to radar—by shaping the airframe to deflect radar waves away and using radar-absorbent materials. This works best against high-frequency radars (shorter wavelengths, like X-band or S-band, measured in centimeters), which are common in modern fighter jets, missiles, and air defense systems. These give high resolution for precise targeting but are what stealth is optimized to evade, allowing aircraft to get closer before detection.
However, Sprey’s key insight is spot-on about low-frequency radars (longer wavelengths, like VHF bands from the WWII era, measured in meters):
- These radars illuminate the aircraft’s overall shape without the deflection tricks working as well, making stealth planes stand out more (though still smaller than non-stealth aircraft).
- WWII systems like the British Chain Home radars (used in the Battle of Britain) operated in this VHF range precisely because early tech couldn’t generate shorter waves reliably. In theory, a restored 1942 radar could pick up a stealth jet’s presence at long range—say, 100-200 miles—because the wavelength is longer than the stealth features (edges, angles) designed to scatter it.
- Real-world example: During the 1999 Kosovo War, a Serbian SA-3 missile downed an F-117 using 1960s-era low-frequency radars (P-18 “Spoon Rest”) to cue the shot. Russia has since modernized these concepts into systems like the Nebo-M or those integrated with S-400 defenses, which detect F-35s at 300+ miles.
That said, Sprey exaggerates the “scam” part:
- Pure 1942 radars suck at practical use today. They have huge antennas (think 100-foot towers), poor resolution (can’t tell one plane from another or separate it from ground clutter like hills/trees), and no modern digital filtering to cut through noise. Detection? Maybe. Guiding a missile? Unlikely without upgrades.
- Stealth does work against most threats: It buys time (e.g., 20-50% longer detection range reduction), integrates with jamming, low-altitude flying, and electronic warfare. No air force relies solely on radar—IR sensors, passive detection, and networks fill gaps.
- Critics like Sprey (who favors simple, maneuverable non-stealth fighters) often ignore how integrated defenses (low-freq cueing high-freq targeting) evolve, but adversaries like China/Russia are investing heavily in multi-band radars to counter it.
In short: Stealth isn’t perfect or invincible, and old-school long-wave principles can expose it, validating Sprey’s skepticism. But calling it a total “scam” ignores decades of successful ops (e.g., F-117 in Desert Storm evading Iraqi radars) and ongoing refinements. It’s more like an arms race where stealth gives an edge, but not a free pass.
References
- CBC Fifth Estate Interview with Pierre Sprey (2012)
- Skeptics Stack Exchange: Can WWII Radars Detect the F-35?
- SOFREP: Why WWII Radars Can Still Detect Modern Stealth Aircraft
- War Is Boring: How to Kill the F-35